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ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Bernard G. Segal t and Edward W. Mullinix t
Characterized as it is by litigation of far greater than average
length and complexity, the antitrust field is one in which matters of
procedure assume unusual importance. Every experienced antitrust
lawyer knows that a case can be, and often is, won or lost long
before trial, either through settlements impelled by full development
of the facts in discovery proceedings or through advantages gained
or lost in the interplay of a host of less tangible factors generated
by the procedural framework within which the litigation progresses.
Chapter VIII, the concluding chapter of the Report of the Attor-
ney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws, is
devoted to the subject of Administration and Enforcement.' Within
this broad rubric, the Committee directed its attention to a series of
specific problems. These problems, and the Committee's recommenda-
tions for their solution, vitally affect the government official and at-
torney on the one hand and the private practitioner on the other.
It is our purpose to explore these effects, particularly from the
viewpoint of the practicing lawyer, to expand some of the problems
necessarily dealt with in capsule form in a report of such comprehensive
scope, and to present some guides to specific application of the Report's
general recommendations. We shall organize our discussion under the
same topical headings used in the Administration and Enforcement
chapter.
By way of introduction, we note the broad procedural framework
within which the antitrust laws are enforced. The Sherman Act carries
criminal sanctions, to be imposed by the federal courts at the suit of
the Attorney General.2 The Clayton Act, on the other hand, carries
no criminal sanction, except under section 2, as amended by the Robin-
sin-Patman Act, providing criminal penalties for certain discriminatory
practices.3 But the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act both provide
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1. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COmmITTEE To STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAws 343-88 (1955) (hereinafter cited as REPoRT).
2. Sections 1, 2, 3, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 3 (1952), as amended,
Pub. L. No. 135, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 7, 1955).
3. 49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952). There has never been a con-
viction under this section. See the discussion in the REPORT at 198-201.
(285)
286 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
for civil enforcement by the federal courts at the suit of the Attorney
General for injunctive relief; 4 and a new section 4A of the Clayton
Act, just adopted ' in conformity with a recommendation of the Com-
mittee,' gives the United States the right to sue (for single damages
only) for injury to its proprietary interests when they are injured by
violation of the antitrust laws. This right had been denied under prior
case law.' There is likewise governmental enforcement through orders
issued by the Federal Trade Commission (1) under an express statu-
tory provision insofar as the Clayton Act is concerned 8 and (2) under
case law ' holding that a Federal Trade Commission order may reach
conduct tending to restrain trade, as an unfair method of competition
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,'" even though
the same conduct might also violate the Sherman Act. Finally, there
is enforcement through suits by private parties in the federal courts
for treble damages or injunctive relief in cases of violation of either
the Sherman or the Clayton Act."
The practicing lawyer, therefore, may find himself representing a
defendant in a civil or a criminal proceeding instituted by the Depart-
ment of Justice, a respondent in a proceeding brought by the Federal
Trade Commission, or either a plaintiff or a defendant in a private
action for treble damages or injunction or both.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Investigations
Factual investigation necessarily precedes formal action, whether
civil or criminal, by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Jus-
4. Sherman Act §4, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §4 (1952);
Clayton Act § 15, 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §25 (1952).
5. Pub. L. No. 137, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 7, 1955).
6. REPoRT at 385.
7. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941). States and municipalities
have always been able to maintain suits on their own behalf, Georgia v. Evans,
316 U.S. 159 (1942); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), but
not on behalf of private persons, Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. American Book Co.,
144 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1944).
8. Section 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §21 (1952).
9. See, e.g, FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948).
10. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
11. Clayton Act §§4, 16, 38 STAT. 731, 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§15, 26 (1952),
as amended, Pub. L. No. 137, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 7, 1955). There is an
area of doubt, however, as to the existence of a private right of action under the
criminal provision of the Robinson-Patman Act. See note 3 supra. Some courts
have declined to regard this section as one of the "antitrust laws" for the violation
of which a private right of action is created by the Clayton Act. E.g., National
Used Car Market Report, Inc. v. National Automobile Dealers Ass'n, 108 F. Supp.
692 (D.D.C. 1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Contra, Balian Ice Cream
Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
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tice. The Report finds that presently available procedures are ade-
quate, through the use of grand jury compulsory process, to obtain both
documentary and testimonial evidence in criminal proceedings.Y In a
civil matter, on the other hand, the Department must depend upon
voluntary cooperation, use of discovery proceedings after a civil com-
plaint has been filed, or resort to a grand jury investigation.' These
procedures are deemed inadequate because: (1) voluntary compliance
is not always forthcoming; (2) there is obvious impropriety in the
practice of filing a skeleton complaint in the hope that facts to support
it may be developed through discovery; and (3) it is inappropriate to
resort to a grand jury investigation when a civil proceeding is con-
templated from the outset. 4
On these findings, the Committee has based its controversial rec-
ommendation for the Civil Investigative Demand, which has been sub-
stantially embodied in a bill now pending in Congress.' 5 Under the
Report's recommendation, the Attorney General would be authorized,
in a civil antitrust investigation, to issue a Civil Investigative Demand
upon any corporation, partnership or association, requiring the pro-
duction of correspondence and other business records, not privileged,
relevant to particular antitrust offenses stated to be under investi-
gation. Enforcement of the demand could be obtained by the At-
torney General through the district court in which the recipient
maintains its principal place of business, and, on the other hand, relief
from such demand could be secured from this court on a showing that
the demand is unreasonable, seeks documents irrelevant to the offenses
stated to be under investigation, or fails adequately to describe the
material required to be produced.' The Report contemplates that the
Attorney General would resort to use of the formal demand where re-
quests for voluntary production of documentary evidence would prob-
ably be ineffective and that use of the demand would end the necessity
for resorting to grand jury proceedings in a civil investigationY.1
The bill now pending in Congress differs from the Report's rec-
ommendation in some significant respects. Whereas the Committee
would have required that the particular offense under investigation
be stated, the proposed legislation requires nothing more than iden-
12. REPORT at 344.
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 344-45.
15. H.R. 7309, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). The bill, introduced by Congress-
man Celler on July 13, 1955, at the request of the Attorney General, is now before
the House Judiciary Committee. It follows substantially the Report's recommenda-
tion. Significant divergences are pointed out below.
16. REPoRT at 346.
17. Id. at 347.
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tification of the statute involved and, "where feasible," the particular
section. Such statutory identification would be so broad as to be
meaningless. A court faced with a problem of relevancy would be in
a much better position effectively to control use of this process if the
Department were required to particularize the offense under investiga-
tion. The other important divergence from the Committee's recom-
mendation is that the bill would permit use of the demand upon any
person, rather than limiting its use to corporations, partnerships and
associations, as the Committee recommended. The broader provisions
of the bill are an unnecessary invitation to more-aggravated problems
under the fifth amendment. Finally, the venue provisions of the bill
in its present form are not properly drafted."8
Controversy, from both directions, has attended the Civil In-
vestigative Demand recommendation. On the one hand, it is argued
that there is really no need to give such power to the Attorney General,
because not more than ten per cent of those who are asked to submit
data voluntarily refuse to cooperate; the creation of such power is
opposed as an undesirable enlargement of executive authority incon-
sistent with the basic distinction between the executive and the ju-
diciary.19 On the other hand, it is argued that limitation of the pro-
cedure to documentary, as distinguished from testimonial, evidence ren-
ders it ineffective; that there is nothing inappropriate in use of a grand
jury for investigation in this kind of matter, but since the Civil In-
vestigative Demand is not proposed as a supplement to existing pro-
cedures, the recommendation must be regarded as ". . . a step to
curtail the Department's most effective investigative device,"-the
grand jury investigation.2"
Both views were, of course, vigorously debated in the Commit-
tee. In voting to reject them and to recommend adoption of this new
investigative device, the Committee was of the view that if, as it be-
lieved, this procedure would greatly facilitate investigations by the De-
partment in civil cases, then despite the fact that subsequent criminal
proceedings would not be barred where a Civil Investigative Demand
had been used-and indeed the documents so obtained could be sub-
mitted to a grand jury-nevertheless, the eventual result would be the
use of grand jury investigations only in cases where criminal prosecu-
18. Section 5(b) permits the recipient of a Demand to seek relief from the dis-
trict court "where the petition [for enforcement by the Government] under Sec-
tion 5(a) was filed." H.R. 7309, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. §5(b) (1955). Since a
petition for enforcement is not intended to be and should not be a condition to the
seeking of relief by a recipient, there should be independent venue provisions for
that purpose.
19. REPORT at 348.
20. Id. at 348-49.
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tion is contemplated. As to the fear of enlargement of executive power,
it was felt that the judicial review provided is an adequate safeguard
against abuse of authority by an Attorney General."
More important, regardless of the adoption or nonadoption of
the Committee's recommendation, is the attitude of the antitrust
bar toward voluntary compliance with the Department's investigative
requests. There is, of course, a natural reluctance to volunteer evi-
dence to a prosecutor, particularly since rights under the fourth and
fifth amendments may be waived. 2 Nevertheless, it is our view that,
generally, the practicing lawyer should follow the practice of volun-
tary compliance and cooperation.
The fact that the ordinary investigation, if allowed to run its own
course, provides no contact between the private party or his counsel
and anyone other than agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
who simply examine documents or records in accordance with instruc-
tions from the Antitrust Division should be no deterrent to such co-
operation. In our experience, the attorneys of the Antitrust Division,
both at Washington and in the field, are readily available to counsel
for parties under investigation when counsel seek conferences with
them.
An atmosphere of voluntary compliance and cooperation permits
the possibility of informal negotiation with Antitrust Division lawyers
which can be exceedingly valuable in the opportunities it presents for
the explanation of equivocal facts and eradication of the prosecutor's
adverse conclusions based on incomplete facts and one-sided presenta-
tions by private complainants to the Antitrust Division. If a full, factual
disclosure at this preliminary stage convinces the Antitrust Division
that there has been no offense, the client will have been saved from an
immensely expensive piece of litigation and, in all likelihood, from the
adverse publicity normally accompanying any indictment or formal
complaint by the Department of Justice. Finally, those of us who, as
a matter of principle, oppose use of grand jury procedures in a civil
matter and would prefer to spare our clients the necessity and embar-
rassment of appearance before a grand jury in an investigation of their
activities have no one but ourselves to blame if our refusal of voluntary
cooperation results in use of a grand jury subpoena by the Department.
21. Mr. Segal, as a member of the Committee, joined in the majority's conclu-
sions and recommendations. Thus, as the Report itself explains, he is in substantial
agreement with the Report's basic analysis and conclusions but does not necessarily
assume responsibility "for each phrasing of each case or shade of reasoning." REPORT
at 5.
22. For further discussion of this entire problem, see Nitschke, Procedure in
Antitrust Investigations, 1950 U. ILL. L. FoRUm 593, 597, 600.
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The Decision To Proceed
In this section, the Report deals with the internal function of the
Antitrust Division, after investigation is completed, in determining
whether to proceed at all, whether to proceed civilly or criminally, or
both, and what relief to demand. 3
It is of particular importance to the practicing lawyer to recog-
nize that the Antitrust Division makes a conscious choice between civil
and criminal litigation in any given case. As reported to the Commit-
tee, the present policy of the Antitrust Division is to proceed criminally
where the case involves price fixing, any other violation of the Sherman
Act where there is proof of a specific intent to violate the act, predatory
practices such as boycotts, or a second violation of the antitrust laws by
a previously convicted defendant. These are not hard and fast rules.
Other factors may be taken into account, e.g., the defendant's knowl-
edge that practices similar to his own have been held violative of the
Sherman Act in a prior civil suit against other persons.
Once the Antitrust Division decides to proceed criminally, it may
decide to file a civil suit as well if the situation is one in which the
Division believes that effective injunctive relief can be obtained. How-
ever, it avoids bringing civil actions against price fixing because any
injunction obtained would add nothing to the proscriptions already
contained in the Sherman Act.
The decision to bring a criminal action is reviewed at a number
of levels within the Antitrust Division. If the attorney in charge of
the investigation is in the field, his recommendation is reviewed by
the field office chief, then by the appropriate litigation section chief
in Washington, next by the first or second assistant to the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and finally by
the Assistant Attorney General himself.2 4
The Committee found itself in general accord with this present
policy but emphasized its desire for a policy of limitation, confining use
of the criminal process to instances " where proof of violation is
23. The question of relief is treated in two aspects: the amount of criminal
fines for Sherman Act violations and the criteria which should govern demands for
dissolution, divorcement or divestiture in government equity cases. The subject of
dissolution, divorcement, and divestiture is treated rather fully in REPORT at 353-58;
to elaborate at all upon it, and to appraise and discuss the basic differences of view-
point, legal, economic and social, expressed in the Report would require an article
devoted to this subject exclusively. As to criminal fines, the Committee's recom-
mendation for an increase has already been implemented by Pub. L. No. 135, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (July 7, 1955), increasing the previous $5,000 maximum fine to
$50,000 rather than the $10,000 recommended by the Committee. REPORT at 352.
24. REORT at 350.
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clear and the law is settled" not only as to the illegality of the practices
involved but also as to antitrust coverage in the field in question. 5
Based on this approach to the choice between civil and criminal
proceedings, the Committee rejected any proposal to prescribe by stat-
ute the line of demarcation between violations to be attacked civilly
and those to be attacked criminally. 6
With an awareness of these policies followed by the Antitrust
Division, counsel is in position, if he engages in informal discussions
with the Antitrust Division, to argue in the appropriate case for a
civil rather than a criminal action. Closely related is the matter of pos-
sible advance agreement on a nolo contendere plea to a criminal indict-
ment or for entry of a consent decree in a civil suit. Such a course
merits careful consideration at this early stage, because apart from
factors like the expense, publicity and other effects of a trial, a
conviction or a litigated decree in favor of the Government becomes
available to private treble damage plaintiffs as prima facie evidence
under section 5 of the Clayton Act 27 and thus opens the way to lia-
bilities which may far transcend the importance of not being on the
losing end of a government case. It should be noted also in this connec-
tion that, again by virtue of section 5 of the Clayton Act, the statute of
limitations applicable to a plaintiff's treble damage action is tolled dur-
ing the pendency of a government proceeding against the same defend-
ant, and a protracted government proceeding can therefore leave a
defendant vulnerable to treble damage suits involving damage periods
covering many years.28
25. Id. at 351. Thus, for example, the Committee deemed it improper for the
Government to proceed criminally in United States v. Southeastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), where the defendants had relied on the inapplicability
of the antitrust laws to premium rates on fire insurance. In somewhat the same
vein, the Report points out that a second offense does not necessarily warrant indict-
ment except where it is substantially the same as the first. RyEPORT at 351.
26. Ibid.
27. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1952), as amended, Pub. L. No. 137,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. §2 (July 7, 1955).
28. Under the holdings of some courts, the suit of United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., Equity No. 87-273, S.D.N.Y., July 20, 1938, was pending from 1938
to 1950. E.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194
F.2d 846 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952). Contra, Barnett v. Warner
Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 112 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1953). The Burnett in-
terpretation is proper because a consent decree had been entered in the Paramount case
in 1940 and continued in effect until 1944 when the Government moved to modify the
decree to seek divorcement and divestiture and the case was then brought on for trial.
194 F.2d at 857. Under the extreme holding of the Twentieth Century-Fox case, and
assuming the applicable statute of limitations to be four years, there is the possi-
bility of a treble damage suit involving a damage period of sixteen years. This is
expensive not only in terms of the potential recovery but also from the standpoint of
litigation cost. The Report's recommendation for a federal statute of limitations
to govern antitrust cases was designed to prevent such a result by providing that any
private plaintiff who relies on the tolling provision of section 5 of the Clayton Act
would be limited to a four-year damage period but could, at his election, recover
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Review Procedure Within the Antitrust Division
Somewhat akin to the kind of preliminary discussion and exchange
of views to which we have referred above is the Committee's recom-
mendation for a review group within the Antitrust Division.
Recognizing that decisions made within the Division merit care-
ful analysis of economic, marketing and business problems, and that such
analysis can best be made". . in an atmosphere not dominated by a
zealous prosecutor bent solely on court success," the Report suggests
establishment by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Anti-
trust Division of ad hoe or continuing groups of staff lawyers and
economists having no prosecuting responsibilities. 29  Such groups
would review any matter submitted by the Assistant Attorney General
either on his own initiative or in response to the request of a potential
or actual defendant. While the Committee suggests no set procedure,
it indicates that a review group could render advice-not binding-
as to the choice between civil and criminal proceedings, as to the relief
to be sought in civil proceedings, and in connection with the negotiation
of consent judgments.
This suggestion is frankly advanced as an experiment. It may
be that the dissenting members of the Committee are correct in feeling
that such procedures would be cumbersome and unduly wasteful since
the same functions are now performed by the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral and his first or second assistant.3" It may also be, as argued in
another dissent, that creation of the review groups would be ". . to
encumber the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion with novel in-
ternal administrative reviews on request of a defendant. ," 81
Nevertheless, we should like to see the experiment made. It can
work, we feel, with intelligent administration and staunch resistance by
the Assistant Attorney General to misuse engendered by inexperienced
defense counsel or attempts to prostitute the process for purposes of
delay. With a strong Assistant Attorney General in charge, this would
seem to be an excellent time to institute the experiment.
The review group proposal is particularly intriguing because of
the possibility it offers defense counsel for discussion or negotiation
with the Antitrust Division in an atmosphere free of an enforcement
official's zeal and his preconceived, however justified, notions of the
case. While such discussions or negotiations even in an attenuated
damages accruing during any consecutive four-year period not otherwise barred.
REPORT at 384. For further discussion of the statute of limitations recommendation
and its legislative implementation, see pp. 308-10 infra.
29. REPORT at 358-59.
30. Id. at 359.
31. Id. at 388.
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atmosphere are desirable in our judgment, it is obvious that they will
be much more likely to be productive if they are participated in by non-
prosecuting representatives of the Antitrust Division whose motives
and attitudes will be less likely to engender fear and suspicion in de-
fense counsel or their clients.,'
To a very substantial degree, antitrust defense lawyers will hold
the key to success or failure of the review group experiment if it is
undertaken by the Antitrust Division. Recognizing the considerations
underlying the proposal and the benefits to be gained from success
of the experiment, counsel for private parties can do a good deal to
ensure success of the experiment and attainment of the hoped for
benefits.
Consent Settlement Procedures
The Report considers five aspects of consent settlement procedures
within the Antitrust Division. This treatment is of significance to the
practicing lawyer in terms of the insight into Antitrust Division pro-
cedures which he should have before entering into negotiations with
representatives of the Division.
Prefiling Negotiation
The Report notes former policy of the Division in refusing to nego-
tiate with defendants prior to the filing of a formal complaint. This
practice, based on a feeling that a complaint crystallizes the issues and
thus expedites settlement, and on a fear that potential defendants would
use negotiations as a delaying device if they were undertaken prior to
the filing of a complaint, has been relaxed recently, and the Department
is experimenting with prefiling negotiations.8 The Report's endorse-
ment of the practice of prefiling negotiations augurs well for their con-
tinuance.
Defense counsel who learn that an investigation is under way
should give careful consideration to seeking settlement negotiations
at the earliest possible time. Assuming that a settlement is desirable
from the defense standpoint, the earlier it comes the better, not only
because the publicity attendant upon entry of a consent decree is likely to
be less unfavorable than the publicity attendant upon the filing of a con-
32. "As any advocate preparing for a legal bout, the antitrust attorney seizes
whatever is helpful, discards whatever might tell against him, draws items together
into a purposive picture. He gathers evidence instead of finding facts; pieces together
a conspiracy rather than dissects trade practice. The grand total at which he arrives
is far more a recitation of wrongdoing than a picture of an industry at work."
TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 16 at 33 (1940).
33. REPO RT at 360
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tested proceeding, but also because, as we indicated above, early nego-
tiation furnishes defense counsel with a better opportunity to present
his position in an atmosphere unprejudiced by the effects of conceptions
publicly expressed and positions publicly taken by the prosecutor.
One Committee member dissented from the endorsement of pre-
filing negotiations on the ground that it would ". . . whittle away the
last remnants of judicial control and public scrutiny in this area.
He argues that ". . . the settlement of an antitrust case ought not to
be a simple matter of bargaining between the Department and the de-
fendant." "
It seems to us the question is one of weighing the interests in-
volved. It is well known that the Antitrust Division has for many
years operated under the handicaps of insufficient appropriations and,
consequently, inadequate personnel. It must constantly select the
investigations to institute and the suits to file on the basis of available
resources and manpower. Early settlement of one case, even though
on terms not so drastic as the best that could be hoped for in a decree
won only after years of litigation, leaves the Division free to commence
other investigations and file other suits. Certainly, the officials of the
Division, charged with the overall responsibility for enforcement of
the antitrust laws, are in the best position to decide when the public
interest is served by an expediting procedure in a particular case. Who
better than they are to be entrusted with such determinations? Cer-
tainly not the courts, for necessarily this is an executive function. The
fears of lack of judicial control and absence of public scrutiny would
appear to be unfounded. Courts normally approve consent decrees in
government instituted antitrust cases without change, relying upon
the same executive responsibility of the Department of Justice which
constitutes the justification for the Committee's recommendation in
the first place. Necessarily, the settlement of an antitrust suit is prac-
tically always, and at any stage, what the dissent seems to fear it will
become under prefiling negotiation procedures, a "matter of bargaining
between the Department and the defendant."
There is nothing in the Committee's suggestion which eliminates
publicity of the consent decree eventuating after prefiling negotiations;
and we suggest that the "public scrutiny" is not very significant in in-
fluencing the course of the proceeding or the wording of a decree.
Negotiation with Less Than All Defendants
Next, the Committee notes that current practice in the Antitrust
Division is to negotiate consent settlements with fewer than all of the
34. Ibid.
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defendants in the case.35 This practice, approved by the Committee,
presents one danger: a defendant who settles may find, sometime later,
that after litigation his original codefendants have convinced the court
to enter less severe relief against them, or no relief at all. To remedy
any such inequity, the Report recommends that the Department of
Justice should, in appropriate cases, ask the court to square the consent
judgment with the litigated decree." Without indicating comprehensive
guides for the situations in which this should be done, the Report sug-
gests, as one example, the case where the litigated judgment was based
on a substantive rule of law applicable to all defendants, or where dis-
similar judgments would prejudice effective competition. 7
This is not to say that there will not still be potential difficulties
which must be taken into cognizance by defense counsel who are nego-
tiating a settlement in behalf of less than all the defendants involved in
the case. Possible disadvantages to the consenting defendants must be
taken into consideration in appraising the desirability of entering into
a consent decree, for absent the Division's willingness to seek a modi-
fication of a consent decree, the defendants will have little chance to
obtain a modification on their own motion, unless they can convince
the court that the entry of a different form of contested decree has
created such a change of circumstances in the industry as to render
it equitable for the court to modify the consent decree.88
Negotiations with Trial Staff
One aspect of the Antitrust Division's current practice, deemed
undesirable by the Committee, is the subject of an affirmative recom-
mendation for change. The Department now requires that consent
negotiations be conducted in the first instance with the trial staff as-
signed to the case. If agreement is reached, the judgment section must
then review it, and further negotiations with the members of that staff
will be necessary if they disagree, as is often the case, with the con-
clusions of the trial staff. Since the Committee regarded this as in-
volving an unnecessary duplication of effort both by government per-
sonnel and defense counsel, the Report recommends that the Division
attempt to avoid such waste by some internal procedure aimed at crys-
tallizing the Government's position before negotiations begin, thus
minimizing renewed and separate negotiation.89
35. Ibid.
36. Id. at 360-61.
37. Id. at 361.
38. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932). See also United States v.
RCA, 46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942).
39. REPoRT at 361.
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Drafting of Consent Decree
Another affirmative recommendation made by the Report is one
of which experienced defense counsel may not always want to take ad-
vantage. The present practice of the Antitrust Division is to require
defendants to submit the initial draft of a consent judgment. Recog-
nizing that this may impose an unnecessary burden on a defendant who
has had no experience with antitrust matters or who cannot determine
from the complaint the relief which the Government considers neces-
sary, the Report recommends that the Antitrust Division submit the
initial draft if the defendants, in good faith, so request.4" Experienced
counsel, however, will find occasions when it is desirable to prepare
the initial draft themselves, in order that it may embody a more com-
plete expression of their own views and approach as the basis for fur-
ther negotiation. This is sometimes more effective than the alterna-
tive of picking away at a draft prepared by government attorneys.
Limiting Scope of Consent Decree
In its final recommendation concerning consent procedures, the
Report urges that the Antitrust Division ". . should not seek relief
(1) deemed by the Supreme Court to transgress constitutional boun-
daries; or (2) which, in the particular case, could not reasonably be
expected after litigation." 41
We believe that the dissent of one member of the Committee mis-
construes the Report's recommendation when it charges that "it is
the close questions of constitutionality that the Majority Report asks
the Government 'not to press in consent negotiations.' "42 The Report
itself makes this clear. Rejecting the argument that the Division
should demand whatever relief its bargaining position can coerce in the
public interest, the Committee took the view that there is a respon-
sibility resting on the prosecutor to stay within lawful bounds.4 Thus,
the Report strikes at past practice of the Antitrust Division in seeking
consent decree provisions, for example, requiring royalty-free licensing
of patents, a remedy refused in the Hartford-Empire case,44 and re-
quiring defendants to submit written reports in connection with enforce-
ment of a judgment, contrary to the Bausch & Lomb holding.4
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 413-18 (1945).
45. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 724-28 (1944).
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The entire question of consent settlement presents problems as to
which generalizations are difficult and apt to be deceptive. A form of
relief held to be inappropriate under one set of facts may be entirely
appropriate in a factual situation seemingly only slightly different.
The important thing from the standpoint of defense counsel is an
awareness of the problem and of the considerations bearing on it..
Counsel approaching negotiations with the Antitrust Division
must recognize that his bargaining position is almost inevitably inferior
to the Division's. It is an unfortunate circumstance that government
officials, whether in the Antitrust Division or elsewhere, are often not
disposed to take the attitude, prevailing in private litigation, that a
settlement avoids the uncertain risks of litigation and that each party
should therefore give up something in order to avoid the risk that a
court will ultimately say he is entitled to nothing. This attitude stems
in part, perhaps, from a feeling that the Government is in a position
different from that of a private litigant and must not compromise the
public interest; in part from what we believe to be the specious belief
that failure to insist on abandonment of certain practices constitutes
outright approval of them; and in part from insufficient consideration
of the factor of expense to the Government which will be involved in
all-out litigation of issues which could be compromised if the Govern-
ment were willing to relax its position. In the relatively uncomplicated
case, therefore, the position of the Government may well be one of "take
it or leave it," and even in the more complicated case where there is
room for some give and take, the Government is usually in the position
of doing most of the taking and very little of the giving.
There are at best only a few intangible factors which may induce
a prosecutor to relax his position. Where he has a weak case, he may
fear that the outcome after litigation will mar his personal record as
a prosecutor. As we have already noted, the prospect of litigation
rather than settlement may be an important one to the Government
if its manpower and other resources are overtaxed at the time when a
settlement is under consideration, conditions acutely present at this
time. But as against these, defense counsel must realize that often
his own desire or need for a settlement is greater because: (1) the fac-
tor of litigation expense will normally be a much more important one
to his client than to the Government; (2) his client may have a very
substantial interest in avoiding too great and continuing adverse pub-
licity; and (3). the particular circumstances may be such that it is im-
portant not to create a magnet for treble damage suits so often pre-
cipitated by an antitrust judgment in favor of the Government.
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Trial Problems
The complexity of antitrust issues creates extraordinary problems
in the handling of trials and of pretrial discovery. Out of the almost
countless number of matters in this connection which have received at-
tention in recent years, the Report has singled out only four specific
issues for treatment.46
Although the Report treats these problems as a part of its discus-
sion of the role of the Department of Justice in antitrust administration
and enforcement, the same problems prevail in private litigation under
the antitrust laws, and the Report's treatment of them is expressly in
terms of both government and private actions.
Single Judge
First, noting the practice in some federal districts of assigning
each antitrust case to one judge for all purposes, the Committee rec-
ommends adoption of this practice in all districts. The recommenda-
tion is based on the obvious desirability of (1) saving the time involved
when more than one judge must become familiar with the complexities
of a protracted case and (2) creating in a single judge a perspective
of the entire litigation which he can bring to bear upon each separate
matter coming before the court as the case progresses through pre-
liminary motions, discovery motions, pretrial conferences and, finally,
the trial itself 7
These objectives are attained in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, where this article is written, through a slight variation of
the practice recommended by the Report. Although the procedure is
not formalized in any written rule, the practice in the Eastern District
in all cases, antitrust or otherwise-is that once there comes before
a given judge any phase of a case through which the judge becomes
familiar with matters going to the merits, then all subsequent pro-
ceedings in the case normally will go to that judge. In the event of
his temporary unavailability, routine matters, particularly those where
there is consent or no opposition, will generally be handled by the
judge who happens to be presiding on the motion list.
This practice has worked well in all types of cases, including
antitrust cases. The only difficulty it has engendered is one that will
be encountered in any situation where a single judge must pass on
everything which arises in a case. While matters where there is consent
46. For a more comprehensive treatment of the overall problem, see JurolCuA.
CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON PRocEDuRE IN ANTITRUST AND OTHER PRO-
TRAcTED CASES (1951).
47. REPORT at 362.
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or no opposition can be handled by another member of the court when
the assigned judge is temporarily unavailable, contested matters of any
significance at all must await availability of the assigned judge. A
contested discovery motion, for example, under the practice in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, must await a listing on one of the
monthly argument lists on which the judge in charge of the case is
sitting-unless speedy disposition of the matter is sufficiently important
to induce the judge to agree to hear it specially, something which the
bar is properly reluctant to ask a busy judge to do unless the urgency
is compelling. This frequently means that a motion will be pending
for as long as two or three months before it can be argued, and it has
not been unusual in our experience to encounter even longer delays.
This disadvantage, of course, is far outweighed by the many ad-
vantages, from the standpoint of the court as well as the parties, in-
herent in the handling of the case by a single judge. Furthermore,
we believe that, to a very substantial extent, some of the delay can
be eliminated if both court and counsel attempt to develop a close
working relationship in controlling the progress of the case. Peri-
odic conferences among the court and counsel for the purpose of sur-
veying the issues pending for decision and planning their disposition
would usually be helpful, particularly in the so-called "big case."
Defining the Issues
The Report next considers the question: how can issues best be
particularized and pretrial discovery most effectively used? The Com-
mittee finds that there has been, in the past, insufficient particularity of
the issues to be tried in antitrust cases, with the result that, under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no effective limit on the
scope of discovery, with the result that, as the Report points out, the
courts are turned into investigating agencies. The Committee notes
a number of factors which have contributed to this problem: liberality
in modern pleading; lack of adequate means for investigation of civil
offenses before a government complaint is filed; and the reluctance of
trial courts to resolve disputed issues of law in advance of trial or to
compel the parties to particularize broad issues.
48
The Committee's recommendations approach this problem in two
stages.
First, in order to achieve a particularization of issues where the
pleadings do not do so sufficiently, the Report suggests three possible
procedures: a defense motion for a more definite statement and a liberal
48. Id. at 362-63.
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construction of rule 12 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
require an antitrust plaintiff to state charges in full and with adequate
particularity; pretrial conferences at which the court and parties would
have before them a detailed statement of issues, initially prepared by
the plaintiff, and at which the court might require a statement of the
defense position as the conference proceeds; and written interrogatories
framed to secure a statement of the issues of fact raised under the
broad charges of the complaint or in an affirmative defense-as dis-
tinguished from interrogatories used to discover evidence.49
Second, with respect to discovery proceedings themselves, the
Report suggests use of a procedure under which any party anticipating
the use of any discovery process would, where feasible, be required by
the court to submit a pretrial statement setting forth to the court's
satisfaction the issues as to which discovery is sought. The statement,
if approved by the court after hearing, would mark the permissible
limits of such discovery unless modified for good cause. The Com-
mittee emphasizes that this recommendation should not limit any proper
use of discovery but rather is designed to prevent abuses which have
occurred when discovery is allowed to run its course without adequate
court supervision.5°
The importance of reducing procedural complexities in antitrust
litigation wherever possible cannot be over-emphasized. Extensive
discovery is very expensive business, involving as it does considerable
stenographic costs for depositions, sizable accountants' fees in many
cases, and substantial legal fees incurred because of the large amount
of counsel's time required not only for the conduct of his own client's
discovery proceedings but also in connection with his opponent's. The
factor of expense, therefore, can turn discovery into a weapon of op-
pression, used for the harassment of an impecunious party, and as an
instrument of delay. Discovery may also be misused by a party seeking
to subvert its processes to the development of information helpful for
competitive purposes rather than for legitimate litigation objectives.
Discovery may be misused when it takes the form of a campaign to take.
the depositions of top corporate officers who know nothing about the
case in the hope of coercing an unmerited settlement. Courts must
be astute to guard against such abuses, under the protective order ma-
chinery of rule 30(b) and through the use, where appropriate, of the
devices suggested in the Committee's recommendations.
The Committee's proposals cannot be regarded as hard and fast
49. Id. at 363.
50. Id. at 363-64.
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rules for indiscriminate application in every case. The approach must
be on a practical level, guided by an appreciation of the legitimate pur-
poses of discovery to uncover facts and crystallize an opponent's posi-
tion. Since extensive discovery effectively eliminates the element of
surprise at the trial, care must be taken in requiring an advance outline
of the purposes of discovery in order that the outline does not serve
as a coaching device for an important witness whom the parties should
properly have at least one opportunity to cross-examine without his
being rehearsed. On the other side of the coin are the practices of
the party who attempts to obtain innumerable items to which he is
really not entitled but who makes the attempt, usually through the
medium of written interrogatories or motions for production of docu-
ments under rule 34, in the hope that a busy judge will not listen to
all of the opponent's sound but necessarily frequent objections and will,
therefore, permit at least a few things to slip through. Courts should
be alert to this device, should strike it down when its use is attempted,
and should invoke vigorous methods to control such a party. In such
a situation, the Committee's recommended pretrial statement could be
of considerable help.
The necessity for formal measures to particularize issues and con-
trol discovery proceedings may become less imperative in the ordinary
case if the Committee's one-judge recommendation is followed. Our
experience in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where a one-judge
system is already in effect, indicates that the problems of particulariz-
ing issues and controlling discovery are less troublesome than in other
districts where matters arising at various stages of the case come before
different members of the court. For example, it has frequently hap-
pened that either under a motion for a protective order pursuant to
rule 30(b), or in connection with objections to extensive interroga-
tories, the court's rulings have been such that they chart the course for
substantially all of the later discovery proceedings in the case. Ex-
perienced, responsible counsel will follow this course because they know
that the same judge is more likely to have the same opinion when a
similar question is raised later than would be the case if a different
judge were sitting. The judge, himself, can properly try to shape
his rulings so that they will guide the course of future discovery, since
he himself will be available to revise his ruling if circumstances change
as further facts are developed. The single judge can use a firm hand
without fear of strait-jacketing the proceedings, whereas absent a one-
judge system, he might be fearful that another judge would be more
reluctant to upset or modify his ruling in light of changed circumstances
as the litigation progresses.
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The approach to the discovery problem must, therefore, be a prac-
tical one. No set of rules can be applied to every case indiscriminately.
The devices suggested by the Committee will be helpful in most cases,
although, indiscriminately used, they might be harmful in others. They
should be used, with discretion, and only where needed.
Limited Period of Relevant Inquiry
Where any party to a proceeding under the antitrust laws offers
proof covering more than a reasonable number of years in the past,
stern measures may be necessary to keep the proceeding from getting
completely out of hand. The landmark decision dealing with this prob-
lem is United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y.5 ' Drawing
heavily on the opinion in that case, the Committee sets forth a number
of guides to be followed in limiting proof and, in particular, in fixing a
cut-off date for proof in cases where that appears necessary.52
Separate Trials
Like the problem of limiting proof, the final matter dealt with
under this heading, that of separate trials, is essentially a question of
practical considerations. The Committee recommends separate trials
of (1) the issues of liability and damages in nonjury 5  treble damage
cases, (2) the validity of patents where that is an issue,5 and (3) the
question of relief where the Government seeks "dissolution, divestiture
or other complex relief posing knotty economic problems." The Com-
mittee suggests also the possibility that in rare instances it may be con-
venient to proceed from issue to issue, hearing all of the evidence from
all parties on each issue before proceeding to the next. Of course, this
procedure can be used only with the consent of all the defendants be-
cause it deprives them of the opportunity to make a motion to dismiss
at the close of the plaintiff's case.55
51. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
52. REPORT at 364.
53. There is no reason why this recommendation cannot be applied to jury cases
as well, under an arrangement whereby the same jury will try the question of
damages immediately following a verdict for the plaintiff. This device has been
used in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. E.g., Harrison v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., Civil No. 12,203, E.D. Pa., where the verdict on the liability issue was for the
defendants, and the parties and the court were thus saved many days of trial time
which would have been involved in presentation of evidence on damages. Power to
order separate trials is given by FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b); see 5 MooRE, FEDERAL
PR.AcrIcE 1217 (2d ed. 1951).
54. We do not share the view expressed by one member of the Committee
(REPoRT at 365) that this recommendation will lead to trial of the patent issue first.
The Committee's recommendation did not deal with the order of trial, a question
which must necessarily be decided on an ad hoc basis, according to the practical
situation existing in the specific case. The possibility that the patent licensee will be
worn down by expensive and protracted patent litigation before he has opportunity
to prove his antitrust claim is one which, if present, should be considered by the
court in making its decision.
55. Ibid.
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The Committee recommends devices such as these in the hope
that their intelligent use will partially alleviate the burdens of protracted
litigation both on the courts and on the parties. The Committee re-
jected, as inconsistent with the function of our judicial process, the sug-
gestion that the courts should be provided with an independent staff of
economic experts, with its implicit premise that judges are not ad-
equately equipped to consider the complex economic problem pre-
sented by some Sherman Act cases.56
Compliance with and Modification of Antitrust Judgments
The Committee's discussion and recommendations on this subject
relate primarily to internal administration of the Antitrust Division in
so far as enforcement of and changes in decrees are concerned.
Of primary importance to counsel representing private parties is
an understanding of the problem of future modification of an antitrust
decree. We have referred earlier to the matter of modifying consent
decrees; ' the situation is the same where a litigated decree is involved.
It is not surprising that two of the Committee's recommendations
in this sphere were unanimous: (1) that the Department conduct reg-
ular studies respecting outstanding decrees to ascertain whether they
have been effective for the purposes intended, primarily to restore com-
petition, and (2) that the Department consent to modification of de-
crees where defendants demonstrate a change in circumstance. While
the Division has always been reluctant to agree to any significant mod-
ification of decrees, and the courts have likewise been disinclined to
order such changes, it would seem that with 378 decrees having been
entered since 1890,58 a change in attitude is indicated. The progress
of the law of antitrust and changes in circumstance occur too often
and too rapidly to permit a "hands off" attitude when a defendant
can establish that a decree has proved too broad or has produced in-
equality in competition.
Finally, the Committee notes the Department's use, where appro-
priate, of provisions which expressly expire after a stated period and
of provisions under which defendants may, after a stated period, show
that conditions have changed so that relief originally necessary to dis-
sipate the effects of past unlawful practices is no longer required. 9
Particularly in the face of the present attitude of the Division and courts
56. Id. at 366.
57. See p. 295 supra.
58. REPoRT at 366.
59. Id. at 367.
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concerning modification of decrees in antitrust suits brought by the
Government, private counsel should be alert to the availability of such
devices and urge them upon the Division in consent decrees and upon
the courts where decrees in adversary proceedings are to be entered.
Advance Clearance and Releases
Lawyers advising clients on the antitrust implications of a con-
templated course of action would find it comforting if they could
obtain advisory opinions from the Department of Justice. However,
the Department takes the position that it has no authority to
issue advisory opinions. The most that the Department will do is
give clearance for a particular merger as not violative of section 7 of the
Clayton Act,"° and, under the Sherman Act, make a binding commit-
ment not to resort to criminal action in any case where it has issued
a so-called "railroad release." " Relatively few requests for railroad
releases are granted. In such cases, the Department requires that there
be a full disclosure of all information, that the plan be prospective rather
than already in operation and, of course, that the facts demonstrate
that both the plan and its contemplated operation are not likely to be in
conflict with the antitrust laws.
The Committee recognized that the generality of the antitrust
laws, coupled with the conflicting and confusing court decisions in this
field, fails to provide the businessman with reasonably ascertainable
standards by which he can determine the legality of a contemplated
course of conduct. Attempts at compliance are hazardous, especially
since the Sherman Act is a criminal statute.
In light of this problem, the Committee considered suggestions
that the Antitrust Division be authorized to issue rules and regulations
of general application and advisory opinions on particular states of
fact, as well as the proposal that the Federal Trade Commission be
authorized to conduct conferences, participated in by the Antitrust
Division and other interested parties, where clearance is sought as to
industry-wide problems.
The Committee rejected these suggestions on several grounds. It
was felt that the Department, as a prosecuting agency, should not be
expected to issue advance clearances. Further, it was considered that
60. FTC clearance for a merger can likewise be obtained, but this is a limited
clearance on a staff, rather than Commission level. Rules 61-63 of the Commis-
sion's General Procedures provide that private parties may obtain "staff views" as to
"'. .. whether or not consummation of the merger would be likely to result in further
action by the Commission." 20 FED. REG. 3057 (May 6, 1955).
61. RO'RT at 367.
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any such clearance would necessarily be of limited value, inevitably sub-
ject to revision in light of subsequent factual developments. Finally, the
Committee recognized that there might be danger in broad advisory
decisions, which could affect the economic life of an industry, made
without the benefit of a set of investigated facts.62 As did the Com-
mittee, lawyers representing private clients must accept as inevitable
a degree of uncertainty in the antitrust field and the unavailability and
undesirability of iron-clad advisory opinions.
However, the Committee expressly recognized also the value of
informal discussions of problems between private counsel and the Anti-
trust Division, a procedure which, as we have previously indicated,
we believe attorneys should eagerly seek and enthusiastically welcome.
First of all, such discussion gives opportunity to even the most ex-
perienced antitrust lawyer to obtain the prosecutor's viewpoint, often
a valuable ingredient for the amalgam of judgment which must be
brought to bear in rendering advice on any serious antitrust problem.
Secondly, if and when an issue later arises, although private counsel
cannot hold a prosecutor to an opinion previously expressed, the fact
of such expression of opinion is bound to have effect upon later dis-
cussions between the parties and with the court to the extent reference
thereto is proper under all the circumstances.
THE FEDERAL TRADE COTMISSION
Of the multitude of problems confronting the FTC, many of which
are similar to those facing the Department of Justice, the Report con-
siders three specific matters only: the Trade Practice Conference, the
FTC's informal settlement procedures and problems of enforcement of
Commission orders and penalties for their violation. The Report also
considers problems arising out of the related jurisdiction of the FTC
and the Department of Justice. Much of what is said on these ques-
tions goes to matters of internal administration as distinguished from
those having a more direct effect on private parties. The Committee's
discussion will provide valuable background reading for anyone under-
taking to represent a client before the Commission, but especially in
light of the fact that, as the Report notes, a number of existing Com-
mission procedures were in the process of study and revision when the
Report was written, new rules covering practice before the Commission
having since been issued,' any expansion by us on what is said in
the Report itself would unduly lengthen this article.
62. Id. at 368.
63. 20 Fan. R G. 3055 (May 6, 1955), as amended, 20 FED. REG. 3303 (May 14,
1955).
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PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUITS
As the Committee characterized it, "the private antitrust suit
blends antitrust policy with private compensatory law: on the one hand,
as one Clayton Act proponent put it, such suits aim to enlist 'the
business public . . . as allies of the Government in enforcing the anti-
trust laws;' the means chosen, on the other hand, is to give 'the injured
party ample recompense for the wrong suffered' by allowing threefold
recovery of damages." 64
In terms of the likelihood of contact with litigation involving the
antitrust laws, the private suit, whether for treble damages or injunctive
relief, or both, is of paramount importance to the practicing lawyer rep-
resenting private clients. This fact is underscored by the mushrooming
of private suits in recent years, as noted in the Report. During the first
50 years that the Sherman Act was in effect, there were only 175 pri-
vate actions, in 13 of which the plaintiff succeeded. Following World
War II, however, there was a great increase. From June, 1947, to June,
1951, the number of private antitrust suits pending in the district courts
grew from 118 to 367, and recoveries increased almost correspondingly.
Since 1951, the growth has been even more rapid.65
Nearly all of the Report is valuable and useful in connection with
the private suit because its substantive teachings are applicable there as
well as to the government proceeding. Furthermore, as we have noted,
some of the matters treated earlier in the Administration and Enforce-
ment Chapter are likewise of equal applicability to the private suit. As
relating directly to the private suit, the Committee singled out for treat-
ment only three specific matters. One of the three, the recommendation
that the United States be given a right to sue for single damages to
its proprietary interests, has already been mentioned.66
Treble Damages
The next and by far the most controversial is the proposal to re-
move the present mandatory treble damage requirement and substitute
discretion in the trial judge to double or triple the damage award.17
The Committee's endorsement of discretionary trebling rests pri-
marily on the view that the generality and the dynamic nature of the
antitrust laws present a serious danger of unwitting violation. The un-
witting violator should, in fairness, be accorded treatment different from
that meted out to the deliberate lawbreaker, just as the Department of
64. REPORT at 378. (Footnotes omitted.)
65. Ibid.
66. See p. 286 supra.
67. REPORT at 378.
ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Justice makes a conscious choice between the punitive criminal action
and the purely remedial civil action for injunctive relief. The Com-
mittee felt that discretionary trebling would not weaken the deterrent
effect of the damage suit because the deliberate violator could not ex-
pect any benefit from the court's discretion. Similarly, the Committee
felt that there would be no curtailment of the incentive to sue; the devel-
opment of substantive and procedural law, largely favorable to the plain-
tiff's position, and the statutory provision for attorneys' fees offer ample
incentive. This is especially true in view of the fact that it has now
been established that the trebled recovery is taxable as ordinary income,
thus materially decreasing the amount which a successful plaintiff can
net." Finally, liberal rules for measuring damages give reasonable
assurance that a successful plaintiff will obtain adequate compensation
for his loss."9
In any event, it does not seem unfair or illogical to reserve the
penalty of triple damages for the deliberate violator-in no case, how-
ever, depriving an injured plaintiff of at least full recompense for his
damage plus his attorneys' fees and costs.
Rejecting the counter-arguments that good faith, good intentions
and even admitted social gains afford no defense to a charge of viola-
tion and therefore should not determine treble damages and that, since
the criminal penalty is light,7" there should be no weakening of the
treble damage threat even though the trebling of damages may in some
cases work an injustice, a majority of the Committee recommended
discretionary trebling. Drawing on the precedents furnished by other
federal statutes, the Committee recommended that the discretion be re-
posed in the trial judge and rejected as impracticable the notion of
spelling out statutory standards to guide the judge's discretion.
71
Several members of the Committee dissented from this recommen-
dation, arguing that discretionary trebling should be limited to Clayton
Act violations but that mandatory trebling should remain for ".
major Sherman Act offenses, normally involving a substantial public
interest .... " " We agree with the majority's rejection of this
refinement because we believe that the basic consideration of eliminating
unfairness to unknowing transgressors applies with equal force in all
antitrust cases, whether under the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.
68. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). A bill pending
in the present Congress would change this result. H.R. 7737, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955).
69. REPoR'r at 378-79.
70. This is no longer true in view of the increase in the maximum fine, from
$5,000 to $50,000. See note 23 supra.
71. REPORT at 380.
72. Id. at 379.
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The same consideration answers the charge of another dissenting
member that ". . . the Committee made no finding of any adverse
effect of the mandatory treble damage provision on the public inter-
est." 73 We believe there is sufficient adverse effect on the public inter-
est in any law which punishes alike the witting and the unwitting vio-
lator, when no such procedure is necessary to compensate adequately
the injured party for any damage he may have suffered or effectively
to enforce the antitrust laws.
An attempt to implement the Committee's recommendation is made
in a bill introduced in the present Congress,74 which, as presently
amended, contains a proviso to the effect that treble damages are re-
quired if the violation is "willful." This provision would, of course,
raise all of the difficulties inherent in the concept of willfulness and
would pose the problem whether the existence of willfulness is to be de-
termined by the judge or the jury. The Committee's recommendation
for an unfettered discretion in the trial judge would be much simpler
to administer and is in line with other federal legislation. In addition,
it would remove the present vexing problems arising out of the ques-
tion whether the jury may be told that its award will be trebled. It
has been held that it is not reversible error so to advise the jury,75 but
not all trial judges will advise the jury that trebling will occur or permit
counsel to do so. The question whether such refusal is reversible error
has not yet been decided.
Statute of Limitations
In its next recommendation, the Committee was unanimous in ask-
ing for the adoption of a four-year federal statute of limitations to gov-
ern all private antitrust suits. This recommendation has already been
adopted and will become effective January 7, 1956.7" Under prior
law, there being no federal provision, the applicable statute of limita-
tions had to be supplied by state law, an approach which, as the Com-
mittee noted, ". . . produced more questions than answers." " An
inequitable and illogical consequence of reference to state law was the
fact that applicable periods of limitation varied from periods as short as
one year to others as long as twenty years.78
73. Id. at 380.
74. H.R. 6875, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
75. Bordonaro Bros. Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 203 F.2d 676
(2d Cir. 1953).
76. Pub. L. No. 137, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 7, 1955).
77. REPORT at 381.
78. Id. at 383-84 n.80.
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The Committee's recommendation for a four-year statute of lim-
itations dealt also with related questions arising under the tolling pro-
vision in section 5 of the Clayton Act, suspending private statutes of
limitations during the pendency of a government suit. Recognizing in-
justices which have occurred where government proceedings have been
pending for many years, the Committee suggested a redrafting of sec-
tion 5 so as to produce a more careful definition of its operation and
to make provisions that: (1) any person relying on suspension of the
statute of limitations should be barred after one year from the end of
the suspension period; and (2) the damages to be recovered by any
such person should be limited to any consecutive four-year period not
otherwise barred.7 9
Only one of these suggestions found its way into the legislation.
As passed, the amendment to section 5 of the Clayton Act changes the
original provision by specifying that the suspension shall be during
the pendency of the government proceeding and for one year thereafter,
and by adding a proviso that, when the running of the statute of lim-
itations is suspended in respect to any cause of action, enforcement
of the cause of action is barred unless an action is commenced
during the suspension period or within four years after accrual of the
cause of action.
The statute of limitations, as it has been adopted, follows the
Committee's recommendation that the statute run from accrual of the
cause of action.8" This is the typical provision found in most statutes
of limitation."' Some of the earlier legislative proposals on this subject
had included a provision that the period of limitations should be sus-
pended, in conspiracy cases, until the plaintiff had discovered the facts
upon which he relied for proof of the conspiracy.' Of course, a statute
phrased in such form would be practically no limitation at all, especially
if it meant, as its language could have been interpreted to mean, that
the statute would not run until the plaintiff had discovered all of the
facts upon which he wished to rely.' The rejection of any provision
79. Id. at 384-85.
80. Id. at 383.
81. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAav. L. REv.
1177, 1200 (1950); UNiFo~m STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS Acr § 2.
82. S. 1910, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ; H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
The provision in S. 1910 allowed the plaintiff, in a case of alleged conspiracy, six
years ". . . after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts upon which he relies for
proof of the existence of such conspiracy, if the plaintiff has exercised due diligence
in seeking to discover such facts."
83. For a thorough analysis of the undesirability of a "discovery" provision and
the lack of necessity for it, see Hearings Before the Subcommittee on H.R. 7905 of
the House Coninittee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 20-22 (1950).
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such as this was, we think, a wise choice on the part of the Committee
and on the part of the Congress in implementing the Committee's rec-
ommendation.
CONCLUSION
Steady progress is being made in the intelligent and effective ad-
ministration and enforcement of the antitrust laws. Much, however,
remains to be done, and the officials in charge of the enforcement
agencies of the Government would, we believe, be the first to concede
this.
Chapter VIII of the Report, which we have discussed, makes nu-
merous suggestions for improvement of internal procedures, for legisla-
tive change and for somewhat altered approaches by the courts. In our
judgment, these will, if adopted, contribute substantially to the more
effective administration and enforcement of the antitrust laws and upon
bases more equitable and logical than at present.
Some of the more drastic recommendations made principally by
one dissenting member of the Committee would appear to be unnec-
essary and might well become instruments of oppression; others should
at least await a trial of the more moderate and, we believe, more
realistic recommendations of the Report.

1
